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1. A Gb:NERAL CHARACTERIZATION OF THE MODELs~
we are going to consiczer an abstract capitalist democracy
~:it.h two competing political parties. Whenever it happens to
be iii power, the left-wing party will extend government
employ-ment programmes until eventually full employment is
reached. The right-wing party, however, will eventually
eliminate those programmes, whenever it gets the chance to
do so.
rlccording to their respective economic positions, we can
distinguish four different groups of persons in our model:
capitalists, workers employed in the prívate ( i.e. capital-
ist) sector, people employed in government programmes and
t.he unemployed. The latter two receive incomes by the
state ,ahich we assume to be linked to those of private
sr~c~tor workers and financed by taxes on private sector
i n~~~,mr~ti .
'1'hc: gt.uups are taken to differ in their voting behaviour.
Gc~i~erally speaking, voting decisions are assumed to be
r~~latecJ to tax levels determined by the level of government
eml~luyment programmes, and to unemployment levels, which are
taken as an indicator of the fear of people to remain or to
become unemployed. As capitalists only have to bear part of
thc- costs but are not entitled to enjoy the advantages of
thuse programmes, they may be considered to vote right-wing.
State employed and unemployed, on the other hand, receive
the benefits but do not share in the costs of state
axpenditures; therefore they may be regarded to cast left-
wing votes only. For private sector workers the situation is
ambi~-alent. We assume that with high levels of total
~:ml~lo..ment (private plus state-generated) an eventusl ahift
to Lht- right takes place, as fear of unemployment declines
and the costs of maintaining this level are high. If
ur,employment levels increase, however, we assume a ahift to
the left, as fears of unemployment rise and costa are
comparatively low. Elections will determine in regular
inter~.als which party is going to form the government and to
implement its specific employment policy.z
Investment.s are taken to be a certain percentage of net
profits, i.e. profits net of taxes. This accumulation quota
can differ with respect to the prevailing political regime.
For instance, it may be somewhat higher under a right. regime
ttian under a left one.~
The growth rate of private sector wages is assumed to depend
on the level of private employment, on the level of state
employment, and possibly also on the prevailing political
regime. Wage claims will increase with rising employment
rates and will possibly be restrained under a left regime as
the latter is committed to improve the employment position
by direct political intervention.
linder the classical assumption of instantaneous product
market equilibrium, private employment is governed by the
levels of the capital stock and labour productivity, the
capital coefficient being constant and labour productivity
rising with a constant rate. The labour force, too, is
assumed to increase with a constant rate of growth.
We could show that without the various feedbacks between the
economic and the political subsystems of the model, both
subsystems would generate cycles of their own (Glombowski
1987). It is the purpose of the present paper to study the
effects of the dynamic coupling of both subsystems under
reasonable parameter constellations.
In the remainder of the paper, we first introduce the
economic submodel (section 2), then turn to the political
subsystem (section 3) and reduce the number of equations and
variables in section 4.Section 5 deals with Lhe (non-)
existence of (long-run) equilibria of the integrated system.
In section 6 we give a few general results and present a
number of simulation exercises. Starting with the extreme
cases of autonomous economic and political cycles, which
arise if the feedbacks are cut off, we go on to consider the
impact of the various feedbacks in turn. The final section
sums up and sketches some perspectives for further work.
A few remarks are in order to indicate where the model
presented here differs from other approaches in this fie.ld.
Nordhaus (1975) does not distinguish between a left- and a
right-wing party but only between a ruling party and the
opposition. His parties are like t,wins: If the oppositiun
would come to power they would do precisely the same thing
as their predecessors, i.e. manipulate the voters by
manipulating the economy in search for a maximum of votes.
We think, however, that parties pursue different goals, i.e.3
ttiat the difference between right and left matters (cf.
Hibbs 1987, Rose 1984 and Rothschild 1986 for empirical ac-
counts). The spirit of our model, therefore, comes closer to
the partisan approaches of Fre,y (1978) or Alesina~Sachs
(1988). While Frey drops the standard public-choice
assumption of vote- maximizing parties, he nevertheless
retains a reelection restriction which compels parties to
break with their ideologically determined politics in the
frrce c-,f popularity deficits and thus to comply with the
wishc~s of the majority of voters. Alesina and Sachs let
their parties maximize objective functions with the same
arguments but different weights. In the present model we
neither introduce reelection restrictions (although they
rnake some sense) nor do we employ explicit ob,jective
functions. In stipulating different economic courses the
parties would implement when in power, an optimization
framework is only implicitly referred to.
The economy is modelled only poorly in a number of political
business cycle models, e.g. by simply taking a version of
the Phillips-curve to represent the economy and the
variables figuring in it (unemployment and inflation) as the
politically relevant ones for all voters alike (e.g.
Nordhaus 1975). We employ a real classical~Marxian business
cycle model as a description of the economy instead, which
differs sharply from either a pure Phillips-curve de-
scription or the new classical macroeconomic approach of
Alesina~Sachs.2 Moreover, we introduce different groups of
voters affected in different ways by our politically
relevant variables. The explicit distinction between
different groups of voters is one of the standard features
of Van Wínden's interest function approach to politico-
economic modelling (Van Winden 1981). As a consequence of
other differences, our group structure differs partly from
his. Moreover, policy goals in our model are not determined
by weighting those group interests.
Our model also differs from well-known Marxist approaches
as Kalecki (1971) and Boddy and Crotty (1975). In their
dcrscriptions political parties do not really matter. as
according to them the state is bound to intervene into the
economy in a way which is functional for capital. Whatever
the mechanisms which make for the realisation of these
imperatives, they operate vis-a-vis all parties. Such
approaches exclude the possibility that capitalist democra-
cies reproduce themselves by means of political consent. In
so far they stand in the tradition of Marx and Engels, who
tended to consider capitalist democracies as profoundly
unstable in the long run, since political majorities of
working class parties are seen as indicators for the
willingness to transform the capitalist economic system
radically or to abolish it altogether ( Engels 1973).1
2. THE ECONOMIC SUBSYSTEM
Our model is formulated in discrete time . We assume that
labour productivity (y) increases with a constant positive
rate of growth ( m) per period, i.e.
y(ttl) - y(t)(lfm) (2.11
In addition, technical progress is taken to be Harrod-
neutral, which means that the output-capital ratio (a)
remains constant over time:
Y(t) - aK(t) (2,2)
In (2.2) Y denotes the net output of the capitalist sector
and K its stock of fixed capital. While the available
capital stock is assumed to be fully used throughout, labour
demand may (and in general will) fall short of labour
supply.3 The latter is denoted by A and is assumed to
increase with the constant non- negative growth rate n,
A(tfl) - A(t)(ltn) (2,3)
Labour demand in the private sector (LP) is obtained by
dividing net output by labour productivity4,
LP(t) - Y(t)Iy(t) (2.4)
We denote the ratio of private (capitalist) employment to
labour supply by Bp,
av(t) - La(t)IA(t) 12.5)
and refer to this variable as the 'private degree of
employment'. Analogously, we can define the 'state degree of'
employment' ( t3g) as the share of state employment (Le) in
the available labour force,
ae(t) - Le(t)~A(t) (2.6)
We now turn to the description of capital accumulation. It
ís assumed to consist out of two parts: one related to net
profits, the other related to the state of the political
regime. Let rp denote the net profit rate and S indicate the
state of the regime, such that
S- 1 ~-~ right-wing government in power
S- 0 ~-) left-wing government in power
We then describe the accumulation process by
K(tfl)~K(t) - lt airo(t) t Saxre(t)
(2.7)
(2.8)5
where ai and az are constant parameters. While the first
one should be strictly positi~-e, the latter is taken to be
nun- negative, thereby including the case of politically
neutral investment behaviour. The sum of both parameters is
assumed not to exceed 1 as all investment has to be financed
out of net pr~ofits. Summarízing the parameter restrictions
we have
a, ) 0, az ) 0, ai t az ( 1




where wD is the real wage rate in the private sector per
person per period and i~ stands for the share of gross
profits taxed away. We postpone the discussion of the
latter's determinants to the following section.
With regard t,o the privat.e sector wage rate we nssume t.hat
its growth rate depends on both degrees of employment as
well as on the political regimes,
wD(ttl)~WD(t) - 1-Hrt8zf3p(ttl)tB~Lie(ttl)f6aq (2.10)
The parameters are taken to be positive except aq, which
could also be zero, allowing for a politically neutral
behaviour of unions. Moreover ax is assumed to be greater
than a3: While a rise in state provided employment may be
expected to strengthen the bargaining position of private
sector unions, it should do so to a lesser degree than an
equivalent rise in private employment since we will assume
that state employees earn less than private sector workers
(see (3.6)). For convenience we write down the restrictions
formally, i.e.
ai ) 0, az ~ a3 ) 0, aq ~ 0 ( 2. l0a)
It may seem odd that there is no lag involved between
employment levels and changes in wage rates. This could and
possibly should be done (cf. Glombowski~Kriiger 1986). The
present formulation, however, has the particular advantage
to allow a direct comparison with the resulta of Goodwin's
model of cyclical growth (Goodwin 1967): If we cut off all
feedbacks from the political to the economic subsystem, we
will obtain (almost) closed cyclical trajectories of the
private degree of employment and the wage share, i.e.
Goodwin's result for a capitalist economy without government
interference. We can then introduce the political feedbacks
one by one in order to find out whether or how politics
matter.f
The fE-c~dbac{cs involvcd arc
(a) the impact of state pro~ided employment un private
sector wages ( as measured by aa),
(b) the influence of the prevailing political regime on the
magnitude of wage claims ( e?tpressed by the size of a~),
(c) the reduction of profits available for accumulation by
taxation ( as measured by r~), and
(d) the difference that the kind of government makes for
the 'animal spirits' of investors ( indicated by as).
3. THE POLITICAL SUBSYSTEM
The economic subsystem contains three variables which it
cannot explain endogenously, i.e. the profit tax rate, the
state degree of employment and the political regime in
power. In order to do so, we neeed a characterization of the
political subsystem. More particularly, we have to specify
the tax system, social security regulations, government
employment policy, the rules of the political game and to
provide a description of voting behaviour.
With regard to employment policy, we assume that the left-
wing party will try to achieve full employment whenever it
comes to rule. More specifically, whenever the private
degree of employ- ment falls short of 1, the state degree of
employment will be stepped up by a constant percentage bi
()0) per period until full employment (i.e. LiptB,-1) is
reached. This assumption of a gradual approach to full
employment is made because it may be impossible to achieve
full employment immediately, at least not if there should
happen to exist substantial unemployment when a left
government takes over.s The implementation of left-wing
employment policy is conceived in an extremely simple way:
Government agencies initiate employment projects in the
state sector, the costs of which are covered by taxes on
profits and private sector wages. Costs of state employment
other than wage costs are ignored as is any contribution to
marketable output the state employed might produce.~ The
left government gives priority to private employment,
however. Whenever full employment has been brought about by
government programmes and the private sector tries to
expand, the left government will set the required number of
state employed persons free. Alternatively, we can assume
that capitalist enterprises will always be able to attract.
the required number. of state sector workers as private jobs
are better paid. These assumptions can be summarized by
"left-wing employment policy"
f3,(t) - min[aB(t-1)tb~, 1-f3P(t)] if S- 0 (3.1)Our right-wing party does not approve of state intervention
in th.~ form of state employment programmes. Whenever it
~~~~m.~ti 1.~~ t~„w~,i i t wi 1 I rt~rlu~~i~ thc~ st,nt,e de~gretr of ~.mployment
gradual.ly by the constant percentage br (~0) per period
until it finally vanishes.a However, this reduction might
not be sufficient to prevent short-run overemployment as
ther~e might be cases in which private employment would tend
to rise faster than the assumed reduction rate of state
employment (b,) would permit. Therefore we have to allow
for the possibility that state employment temporarily is
reduced by more than b~, as private sector expansion has t.o
be given priority status in a right-wing strategy. These
assumptions can be summarized follows
"right-wing employment policy"
B9(t) - min (max[Bs(t-1)-b~, 0], 1-(3P(t)) if S-1 (3.2)
The right-wing party would claim that the gradual reduction
of state employment actually contributes to the achievement
of full employment as the concomitant fall of profit taxes
stimulates private employment via higher investment.
We can lump together both employment policies in the
formulation
f3a(t)- (1-S) min[Li5(t-1)fbi , 1-Bp(t)]t
t S min {max[BB(t-1)-br, 0], 1-BP(t}}
(3.3)
Let us now turn to the social security system. We assume
that the unemployed receive a constant percentage (go) of
net private sector wages, i.e.
w„(t) - gu[1-iw(t)]wp(t} (3.4)
where w„ is the dole per unemployed person per period and i.,
denotes the share of taxes in gross private sector wages.
Likewise, we assume that the government employed receive a
constant fraction (ga) of net private sector wages,
we(t) - ga[1-iM(t)]wP(t) (3.5)
where wei is the salary of a state employed person per
period.9
We will require that the incomes of state employees exceed
those of the unemployed:
1~ ga ~ g~ ) 0 ( 3. 6)
Total government expenditures (T) amount to8
T(t) - we(t)l3s(t)Alt) } wa(t)gi{t1A(t) ta.r)
where t;r denotes the degree of unemployment defined by
gr (t) - 1-L~v (t)-Bs (t)
(3.8)
There are a number of ways in which government expenditures
can be financed.ro Here we assume, in order to avoid
complications that expenditures are fully covered by- taxes
on private sector incomes. The respective tax ratios are
adjusted such that a constant percentage (E) of expenditures
is collected in the form of taxes on profits, while the rest
is paid out of private sector wages. r~ ln c,rder tu c'xpress
these assumptions it is cunvenient to introduce the sharE~
of (private sector) wages (u) and the profit share (1-u),
both before taxation. The wage share can be written as
follows:
ult) - wv(tlav(t)Alt)~Y(t) - wv(t)~Y(t) (3.9)






which can be solved for tw and tc in terms of N, Y and T,
respectively. With respect to the tax shares, we assume that
the employed workers always have to pay taxes, while
capitalists will have to do so in general, but can be
exempted from it in extreme cases. This amounts to
(3.lla)
As an implication, the wage tax rate will always be
positive, exept for the extreme case of private full
employment, i.e. when there is no need for taxation. In the
latter case the tax rate on profits would be zero as well,
but that could be brought about by shifting the tax burden
entirely to the workers,too.
Finally, we have to introduce assumptions with respect to
voting behaviour. Let us first consider the group of private
sector workers. We assume that their voting behaviour
changes in response to two variables, i.e. the level of
unemployment and the tax rate on wages. A rise in the tax
rate will tend to diminish the share of left votes, as a
rising number of workers turn to the right in search for tax
reductions. On the other hand, there will be an increase in9
thr Ic~fl ~i~tc tih~cre with a rise in uncmploymc~nt, as more ancl
mc,rce wvrkers become frightened of loosing their jobs.
Alternatively, one could point to a growing conviction among
workers that unemployment ought to be reduced and that
government employment programmes were undispensable to
achieve this effectively. We employ a linear
"vote shift function"
lw(tfl)-lw(t) - min (brgi(ttl)-bZiM(ttl), 1-lw(t)] (3.12)
where 1.,(t) denotes the share of left votes actually or
potentially ( i.e. in off-election years) cast by private
sector workers at the end of period t. Defining the
function as the minimum of the two expressions in square
brackets guarantees that the left vote share among private
sector workers can ne~~er exceed one. ( Of course, lw must
not become negative either and its initial value should lie
between zero and one.) Both parameters indicating the
political sensitivity with respect to economic variables are
taken to be positive,
b, ) 0, bs ~ 0 ( 3.12a)
Note that a lag of one time period is assumed and that the
politically relevant variables do not determine the level
but the change in the left vote share.
The overall left vote share (1) is, of course, a weighted
average of the left vote shares of the distinct groups in
the total population,
1(t.)-1~(t)k~(t)tl„(t)k„(t)}la(t)ka(tltl„(t}k„(t) (3.13)
where the subscripts c, w, s, and u refer to capitalists,
private sector workers, state employees und unemployed,
respectively, and the k's are their respective weights.l~
Now let the number of capitalists be a constant multiple (0
~ k( 1) of the labour force so that the absolute number of
capitalist voters is kA and the total number of voters
amounts to A(lfk). We can then determine the weights as
follows
k~(t) - k~(ltk) - const. ~ 1~2 (3.14)
k„(t) - Bp(t)~(lfk) (3.15)
ke (t) - Lia (t)~(lfk) (3.16)
k„(t) - g,(t)~(ltk) (3.17)lo
What about the voting beha~iour of the other three groups'
They are faced wit.h the same general economic situation as
private sector workers, but their (actual) own economic
positions differ from those of the latter. Capitalists, for
instance, have to pay taxes as long as there are any state
employment programmes left, but they are not threatened by
unemployment. Thus we may expect that their votes would
gradually shift to the right in time. On the other hand,
neither state employed nor unemployed pay taxes according to
our assumptions, while both groups either face or already
experience unemployment. Therefore, we would expect their
votes to shift to the left eventually.13 Assuming for
simplicity that those shifts have fully worked out~~ , we
are entitled to stipulate
l~lttl) - 1~(t) - 0 (3.18)
ls(ttl) - 1,(t) - 1 (3.19)
1„(ttl) - 1„(t) - 1 (3.20)
Our assumptions on voting behaviour made so far are
sufficient to describe the dynamics of the left vote share
among the total population.
We assume that there will be no changes in government
between elections and that the party winning the majority of
votes at the end of an election year will form the new
government. at the beginning of the next, one. More formally,
we can express this assumpt.iun by 's
if 1(t) ) 0.5 then S- 0 for~ ttl until t}0
if 1(t) ~ 0.5 then d- 1 for ttl until ttg
where t refers to election years only and 0 is the fixed
length of the election period. This completes the descript-
ion of our model.
4. RBDUCTION OF THB NUMBSR OF BQUATIONS AND VARIABLB3
It will be convenient for further considerations to reduce
the number of variables and equations. First of all, we
develop an expression showing the determinants of private
employment dynamics. From (2.5), (2.4) and (2.2) we obtain
ap(t) - oKlt)~[y(t)A(t)) (4.1)
Taking (2.1) and (2.3) into account, the growth factor of




Rewriting the net rate of profit as
r„(tl - [1-N(t)][1-i~.lt)]a, (4.3)
the growth factor of capital becomes (cf. (2.8))
K(ttl)
- 1 t (ait8az)a[1-u(t)][1-i~(t)] (4.4)
K(t)
Hence the growth factor of private employment turns out to
be
f3P(tt]) lf(a~}Saz)a[1-v(t)1[1-r~(t)]
13P (t) ( lfm) ( ltn)
(4.5)
The devolopment of state employment has already conveniently
been expressed by (3.3).
Next, consider the development of the ( gross) wage share.




which, in view of (2.10) and ( 2.1), leads to
~(ttl) 1-a~tazBP(ttl)ta3Be(tfl)t8a4
- (4.7)
u(t) 1 t m
The tax rates on profits and wages are relevant for
accumulation and voting behaviour, respectively. Dividing




The tax rate on wages, in turn, can be shown to depend on
the employment rates and the parameters of the social
security system: From (3.7), (3.9) and (3.10) we find
wB (t)Bs (t) t w„ (t)gi (t)
(1-E) (4.9)
w P( t) B P( t)lz
which, after substitution of (3.4) and (3.5), yields
gsBe (t) f gugt (t)
(4.10)
gbBe(t)tg„g,(t)tBp(t)I(1-~)
Finally, consider the determination of the overall left vote
share. Taking (3.14) to (3.2U) into account, (3.13) is
reduced to the simpler expression
llt) - [1-[1-1„(t)]Bp(t))~(lfk) (4.11)
where lw(t} is determined by (3.12).
Our reduced system contains the two employment ratios, the
wage share, the two tax ratios, the left vote shares in
total population and among private sector workers, and,
finally, the regime indicator. It is made up of the
equations (4.5), (4.7), (4.8), (4.10), (~3.1]), (3.31, (3.12)
and (3.21). Of course, the definition (3.8) would have.r to t,e
added, if gl were counted as a variable in íts own right.
Whene~~er wanted, the tax rates could be eliminated from the
system by substituting them into (4.5) and (3.12), respect-
ively. That would leave us wit.h a system in six variables
only.
5. THE UNSUSTAINABILITY OF LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIA
Let us first check whether any long-run equilibrium exists
for the system as a whole. In the present context it seems
appropriate to define such an equilibrium as a process in
time, in which the income distribution and the private as
well as the state degree of employment remain constant and
in which no change in political power occurs. By implica-
tion, there may be two (types of) equilibria, supporting
either a permanent right- wing or a permanent left-wing
majority. Let us call the former a'free enterprise' and the
latter an 'interventionist' equilibrium.
First, an interventionist equilibrium should satisfy the
condition
BPi f Bei - 1 (5.1)
because a left-wing government would not stop expanding
state employment until overall full employment were reached.
The additional subscript 1 refers to the left-wing character
of the hypothetical equilibrium, and the time index is
dropped as constant values of both degrees of employments
are to be found. This pair should, secondly, support a
constant wage share, which, regarding (4.7), implies13
mt;ri - ny (.lp~ t~~~~ ~n ~ (5.21
From these two conditions we can determine the potential
long-run equilibrium values of employment rates, i.e.
I3p I - ( mtal -83 ) ~ { a2 -a3 )
- ( az -m-ai ) ~ ( az -a3 )
(5.3)
(5.4)






This follows from ( 4.10), as the overall degree of unem-
ployment is put equal to zero. But then we can conclude from
(3.12) that the vote shift among private sector workers is
negative, i.e.
lw(tfl)-lW(t) - -bsiWi C0, (5.6)
As the proportions of our four population groups remain
constant under the equilibrium hypothesis, the negative vote
shift among private sector workers implies the same tendency
for the total population. (This follows from (4.11) if Bp(t)
becomes a constant.) Therefore, we find that a unique
interventionist equilibrium does exist for a short or a
medium term, but that it cannot be sustained in the long
run.
This result does not imply the general impossibility of a
permanent left-wing rule as we shall demonstrate in the next
section.
What about the sustainability of a'free-enterprise'
equilibrium? It clearly should satisfy
4is~ - 0 ar.3 (5.7)
0 C Bp~ - const. C 1, (5.8)
the notation being chosen in analogy to the interventionist
case. From {4.7) we obtain
Bp r c ( mfa~ -s~ 1 ~az




For this hypothetical csse the wage tax rate turns out to be1 ~1
gu(1-BPrI
iwr - ~ 0
gu(1-BPr)tBPrrll-E)
(5.11)
and must be considered to be positive. As the shares of the
social groups in the population are again constant (with ksr
equal to zero), the vote shift among private sector workers
again dominates the overall result. The 'free-enterprise'
equilibrium cannot persist in the long run if the condition
lw(tfl)-lw(t) - b,g,r-bzTWr ~ 0 (5.121
is met. However, it is not obvious it will always hold.






Thus any of the following three conditions, i.e.
gu -) 0 15.14)
E -) 1 (5.15)
bz C b, (5.16)
would be sufficient, although not necessary, to guarantee
that in due time a new left-wing government would distort
the established 'free-enterprise' equilibrium. (5.16) can
easily be interpreted. The parameters express the intensity
of the aversion among private sector workers against
unemployment and taxes, respectively. Whenever the former is
at least as great as the latter a free-enterprise equili-
brium cannot last forever. This result is based on the
circumstance that the unemployment rate is strictly greater
then the wage tax rate. Taking this into account, (5.16)
follows from (5.12) immediately. If tax aversion is stronger
than unemployment aversion, a low tax rate may help to make
the vote shift positive. This is expressed by (5.14) and
(5.15), since the wage tax rate is lower the lower unem-
ployment benefits and~or the workers' share in taxation are.
lt may seem strange that, the chances for a right-wing part.y
to loose power should increase with higher equilibrium
rates of private employment: The right-wing government could
point to its successes, while the need for a further15
rc~ductiun of unemployment is likely to appear less urgent.
Ilowe~.er, one can show that the wage tas rate decreases more
than the unemployment rate if private employment rises,
~.rhich means that the left par~ty profits from higher
equilibrium employment rates.rb
For the sake of completeness we should mention that there is
a third type of hypothetical long-run equilibrium charac-
terized by- permanent (private) full employment. In this case
~e would neither have taxes nor unemployment or state
employment, which implies that no vote shift would occur.
The party that happens to be in power when this type of
ecluilibrium is first reached retains its majority forever.
This case would render our model irrelevant. However, we
feel it is irrelevant itself.
6. PATTEI2NS OF FLUCTUATIONS
It is difficult. to deri~e general results for a dynamic
system that requires choices of a number of initial
conditions and contains quite a lot of parameters (actually
18), although most of them are restricted with respect to
sign and~or magnitude. Therefore, we will, at least in
part, have to rely on simulations. As we do not use
empirically estimated parameters but rather hypothetical
ones, the exact quantitative results of simulation runs are
not ~~ery interesting. In focussing on the qualitative
aspect of solutions we try to answer questions like the
following ones:
- will solutions display regular (e.g. sinusoídal) oscil-
lations or rather irregular fluctuations?
- Which parameter changes are conducive to stability or
inst.ability?
- Which parameter changes will affect the periodicity of
fluctuations?
- Are there solutions in which no political switches occur?
- What determines the frequency of switches between politi-
cal regimes ?
We believe that these questions can best be tackled by
stai-ting from very special conditions, that is to say from
conditiorrs under which "autonomous" economic or political
cycles would occur. "Autonomous" refers to either the
independence of private sector fluctuations from employment
policies, or - the other way around - to the independence of
movements in the vote share and state employment from
private sector fluctuations. Those situations, as will
become ob~~ious below, are not compatible with the imposed
parameter restrictions, as they require that the feedbacks
between the political and the economic subsystems are cut16
c~ff in at least one direction to pre~~lude "distortions". ke
~,an then pruceed by discussing how t.he shape of those
"autor,umous" cycles is modified if the fcedbacks are (re-)
introduced step by- step. Moreo~.er, we can try to find out
which of the basic ingredients, if any, dominates the
combined outcome. Ha~~ing arri~-ed at an example which takes
all feedbacks into account, we can take this as a re-
presentati~-e case and comparc it with a series of ~,thers
produced by isolated and combined parameter changes in
~-arious directions.
As a preliminary to the introduction of autonomous cycles,
let us briefly consider under which parameter constellations
~Je would have no cycles at all, but rather steady statcs. On
the basis of the analysis in section ;i this is a simple
task. If we put br and bz equal to zero, we are sure that
there will be no vote shifts among pri~ate sector worlcers.
,~n initial left-wing majority in an inter~entionist
equilibrium can then be sustained forever, including a
constant left-wing majority share. If we start with a right-
c.-ing majority in a free enterprise equilibrium position
instead, the latter can be sustained including a constant
right-wing majority.
We are going to talk about an autonomous political cycle,
if, on the basis of a constant private employment rate, the
political scaitches are exclusively caused by alternating
partisan employment policies. In order to obtain such a
cycle, we have to {relintroduce the feedback from the
economy- to politics, that is to say, we have to choose
positive parameters of the vote shift function. On the
other hand, we have to make sure that an initial economic
equilibrium position of pri~~ate employment is not disturbed
by polit.ical switches. In order to guarantee this, we must
cut off al] feedbacks from the political sphere to capital
acumulation and wage formation. We recall that this implies
that accumulation is not disturbed by profit taxes (E - 0),
that workers' wage demands do not reflect the level of state
employment (a3 - 0) and, finally, that neither workers nor
capitalists let their behaviour depend on the prevailing
political regime ( aa - az - 0). In this special case, both
equilibrium rates of private employment are identical with
that in Goodwin's growth cycle model (Goodwin 1967). Figure
1 provides an example of such an autonomous political cycle.
It should be read as follows: Along the horizontal axis time
is measured (100 years). The vertical axis measures various
variables in percentages: From the bottom to the top we
find the degree of state employment, the (overall) left vote
share and a broken 5096- line, the (gross) wage share , the
private employment rate and, finally, the total employmentli
rat~~.~~ 'Ihe etample given is special in so far as bi - bs
an~i b~ - b, while both pairs of parameters are assigned
mediwn ~~alues. The time paths of state employment and of the
left ~-ote share are very regular and political switches
occur in a certain rhythm.
By w,i~ of analogy, one is tempted to define an autonomous
er~~~n~nuic ~~yc.lcr as a cycle in the private rate uf employment
which is not disturbed by the effects of employment policies
and in which the vote shares remain constant. Such cycles
cannot exist, however, since even under the assumption br -
bz - 0, which bars ~.ote shifts among private sector workers,
the voting shares are bound to fluctuate whenever private
Prnployment does. This simply is a consequence of fluctua-
tions in the relative sizes of the groups of voters we have
distinguished. Thus it seems more appropriate to define an
autonomous economic cycle as a private employment cycle
which is neither affected by employment measures nor by
eventual regime switches. Those sutonomous economic cycles
can occur with or without concomitant regime switches.
Figure 2 shows such a cycle under a permanent right regime.
The left-wing vote share fluctuates but remains under the
5096-1ine throughout. No state employment projects are ever
initiated and no taxes ever paid for that goal. The
cyclical movements of private employment and of the wage
share are very regular. In fact, we have a discrete-time
version of Goodwin's growth cycle. Therefore, the period and
the amplitude are (almost) constant, the size of the
amplitude depending only on the initial displacement from
the steady state. Figure 3 shows an autonomous economic
cycle under a left regime. Full employment is preserved from
the very start and the fluctuating vote share remains
per~manently above the 50?G- threshold. Private employment and
the wage share develop in exactly the same way as in figure
2 since nothing has been changed except the initial value of
state employment and the initial political conditions.
An interesting case arises if the initial majority of one of
the parties is sufficiently small or if the initial
deplacement from equilibrium is sufficiently large. The
economic cycle remains of the Goodwin-type i.e. unaffected
by political feedbacks; but now it produces a political
cycle with (almost) the same period as the economic cycle
(cf. figure 4). The reason for its oecurrence is, of
course, that in the absence of vote shifts within the groupa
shifts of their respective weigths are sufficient to cause
political switches.is
What happens to autonomous political cycles if they become
"infected" by autonomous economic cy-cles' Comparing figures
5 and 1 we see that the time paths of the left vote share
and of state employment do not change much under the
influence of the "infection". This "immunity" is e~.en better
seen if we compare the autonomous high-frequency political
cycle 8 with the outcome after introducing the autonomous
loc,-frequency economic cycle: The high frequency of the
autonomous pulitical cycle remains after the lower frequency
of the autonomous economic cycle is added (cf. 7). It is
like moving a set of skyscrapers from a flat plain into a
landscape of rolling hills: The skylines will create almost
the same impression.
.~s long as we ha~e autonomous economic cycles, the effect of
left-wing governments on overall employment and income
distribution remains transparent: Since the development of
private employment is not affected, any state-provided
employment is additional and hence increases total
employment. As the distribution between capital and labour
remains the same, the additional income of the state-
employed is exclusively due to state-managed redistribution
between sectors of the working class.
will autonomous economic cycles always produce political
switches given their impact on the vote shift? Consider the
sustainability of a left-wing regime first. Whenever it
realizes permanent overall full employment, this will cause
a permanent vote shift in favour of its adversary- so that in
due time a political switch is bound to occur. But a left-
wing government may not command over the capacity to
preserve full employment permanently once it has been
achie~~ed. The rate of decrease of private employment in a
cyclícal downturn can outstrip the left-wing party's ability-
to engineer compensatory increases of state employment at
the same speed. Therefore, a too small bi can imply
regularly recurring, although limited, amounts of unemploy-
ment. If bl is sufficiently large compared to bz, the left
vote can always recover before it is forced under the 5096-
line. It can everi display a positive trend. If, on the
conti-ary, we let bz rise while keeping br constant, we are
bound to find combinations in which the left vote share
shows cyclical movements around a declining trend, bringing
about a political change sooner or later. Figures 8, 9 and
10 represent cases with a rising, constant and declining
trend of the left vote share, corresponding to rising levels
of bz under otherwise unchanged conditions.19
This r~~sult est.ends to the opposit.e case. Lnder a right.-wing
ret~ime th~~ autonomous economic cycle can coincide with
~rit.her a rising, a constant or a negative trend in the right
party's sharc~, corresponding to low, just right and high
le~els uf br with respect to a constant bz. Of course, thc~
majority will eventually get lost in the latter case.
Figures 11, 12 and 13 illustrate the respective cases.
t:nt.il now we neglected feedbacks from the politicaáa syá2em
tu wage formation and accumulation by putting aa -
~- 0. What effects will it have on the pattern of fluct-
uations if we (re-)introduce them? Bxample 14 shows that a
positive aa does not seem to modify the period of private
employment cy-cles, as shown in 2 or 4. It is obvious,
however, that the amplitude increases until this process is
arrested by hitting the full-employment ceiling (cf.
example 15 which is identical with 14 but shows the time
paths for 200 years). A very similar result is obtained if
we let capitalists' investment behav-iour depend on thWe
find
of the political regime (az ~ 0; cf. 161. Again,
increasing amplítudes if we introduce profit taxation (E ~




in~-estment and private employment.
The three feedbacks from the political WP~hrethe
tautonomous
sector considered so far do away
character of the economic cycle. Although the fluctuations
retairi their cyclical form, increasing amplitudes indicate
that the feedbacks have destabilizingwómpaou~s.oOnethen
three
that the combined effects of any
feedbacks or the joint effects of all the three of them
produce the same qualitative result.
Vone of the cases displayed so far fulfilled all the
parameter restrictions we imposed. While aa - az - E- 0 do
not violate our parameter restrictions but only represent
extreme choices, the choice of a3 - 0 clearly contradicts
(2.10a). The fluctuations occurring with a positive feedback
fr~om state employment to wage claims do not seem to work
destabilizing, as the amplitudes do neither uniformly
increase or decrease in time. The irregular pattern may be
repeated after some time as example 18 suggests.
Long-term irregular fluctuations in the sense of not
uniformly increasing or decreasing, but rather fluctuating,
amplitudes can be the outcome of the joint operation of onezo
~~t~ morc uf thc~ thr~~c~ f'urmc~rl~ dis~~ussc~d f~edback~. al~,ngsic3c
with :t~. 'fhis is ~Icmoutilr:rtecl h} fit;ure 19. ftn t,lte uth~'r
hund , we-~ f i nd uYamp 1 ~~s w í 1 h s te?ad i 1 y i ni'r,~as i nti :Lmpl i t uci,~ ~
as well, lik~ 20. All these u~amples ha~~e in c~ommon Ihal.
they gi~e rise to more or less regular political 5c:itch~~s.
what general statements can we make with respect to those
tc.o types of movements? As far as the increasing-amplitudes
case is concerned, we must expect that it eventually leads
to similar mo~~ements as the autonomous economic c~-cles
discussed abo~e: The increasing cycles of private employment
will sooner or iater hit the full employment ceiling, after
which they are likely to be transformed into regular cycles
wit.h (almost) constant amplitudes. They may then be
accompanied by permanent switches of political power or not.
Figure 21 shows an example in which the left-wing par~ty
tceeps its majority after the stage of regular constrained
cycles is attained. As we have already found out in the
autonomous economic cycles case, t.his is onl,y possible as a
consequence of the failure of the left government to fully
offset private employment reductions during part of the
cyclical downturns. Taking a value for bt which is high
enough for a left government to preserve full employment
once it has been reached, even a very low tax a~'ersion
cannot preclude occasional comebacks of the right-wing
party. An example for this is pro~~ided by figure 22. On the
other hand, we can also have a permanent right-wing majority
in our constrained cycles case as demonstrated by figure 23.
One should note that in order for the latter case to occur,
capitalists have to pay part of the taxes as this is the
only factor working for an increase of amplitudes: linder a
permanent right-wing government the parameter a3 fails to
transmit any impact from state employment to private sector
wage formation simply because there never is any state
employment. Moreover, if S-1 throughout, the parameters aa
and az can be added to az and ar, respecti~~ely, leaving us
with an autonomous cycle which can only then (exceptionally)
appear as a constrained one, if initial conditions deviate
suffieiently from the (modified) equilibrium values. A
comparison of figures 23 and 24 shows the special rule of' a
positive profit tax share: The constrained cycle of figure
23 becomes an autonomous one (figure 24) only because the
profit tax share is put equal to zero in the latter case.
Let us now pay attention to the type of unconstrained
irregular fluctuations. A basic characteristic for this type
seems to be that it necessarily implies political switches.
While we do not attempt to provide a formal proof of thiszi
conjrcture, the informal argument runs as follows. Permanent
rir;hL-wing guvernment is only possible in three forms, i.e.
in ~~~,mbination wiLh a free enterprise equilibrium, with an
autonumuus economic cycle or with constrained regular
cycles. These types, of course, do not fulfill the require-
ments of unconstrained irregularity. As to permanent left-
wing majority, we have shown already that it can only occur
under constrained cycles with some measure of unemployment
reappearing in every downswing. This is not an unconstrained
irr~egular cycle either. Therefore, the unconstrained
irregular type of solution must be due to political switches
ur rather to parameter configurations which imply them.
Conducive to them are a rather high value of br and a
balance between tat and unemployment aversions (b, - b:).
The existence of political switches given, we have to
specify cahich parameter constellations are likely to avoid
constrained cycles. We saw above that a positive tax share
of profits makes for rising amplitudes, which was also true
for positive values of a, and az. Hence it seems an
appropriate conjecture to assume that positive values of a3
work in the opposite direction. This influence can only
become effective if state employment esists, which in turn
presupposes that left-wing employment policies are practised
at least intermittently. Figure 25 shows the dampening
influence of a3 under a long period of left- wing govern-
ment,. Note that while the amplitudes are reduced they do not
seem tu ~~anish, but rather to approach some limit.1e
Unconstrained írregular cycles seem to be the outcome of
political factors conducive to political changes (indicated
above) together with some balance between the permanently
operating destabilizing impact of positive profit tax shares
and the temporarily operating stabilizing effect of the
feedback from state employment to private wage formation.
Positive values of aa and az also contribute to irregu-
larity by shifting the long-run equilibrium values of
private employment which together with their actual values
at the t.ime of the political switch determine the diatances
from the equilibrium positions and thus the "initial"
amplitudes.
The unconstrained irregular type of solution seems to be
more interesting than either equilibrium solutions or
regular cycles, whether of the constrained or the autonomous
economic cycles type, since in real capitaliat democraciea
there are political switches and irregular fluctuations,
while (private) full er~ployment is certainly not achieved in
every boom. Of course, this does not mean that the irregular
unconstrained solutions of our model produce the right
outcomes for the true reasons.LZ
as a final e~ercise, we c:ill ha~-e a look at thc effects of
various paramrter changes for thc f~~stures c,f irregular
uncunstraint~d solutiun5. ']'he spi~~~ific casi~ shuwu in fiy;urc
26 serves as a point of reference. It is a special symmetric
onF~ since b, - bz and b, - h, .
Other things remaining equal, a simultaneous decrease in the
~~ote shift coefficients br and bz tends to reduce fluctua-
tions in the vote share with the side effect that the
frequency of political switches in general will be reduced
(compare figures 26 and 27). The result is plausible: If
political preferences are less accentuated, a gi~en change
in the employment and tax variables produces less political
impact, which in general eltends the life of governments.
Reducing, ceteris paribus, the rates of state employment
changes bi and br simultaneously, we find that the number of
sc:itches is reduced and that the fluctuations in the vote
shares become more pronounced (cf. figures 26 and 28).
This, again, is intelligible: As parties (have to) take
t.heir time in effecting the desired changes, they longer
benefit (in terms of votes) from the dissatisfac.tion with
t.he pre~~ious government's performance.
Applying the above parameter changes simultaneously, i.c.
choosing all values high (low) at once, fluctuations in
~ote shares are greater (smal].er) and switches occur more
(less) often in the all-high (all-low) cases (cf. 26 with
29). By increasing all the "b"-coefficients sufficiently and
manipulating some other parameters a little bit, we can even
produce the extreme result that majorities change with each
election (see 30).
For all the cases mentioned, moderate proportional changes
in the cost parameters g9 and g„ do not change the features
of the fluctuations we observed before. Moreover, nothing
fundamerrtal is changed if we allow for an asymmetry between
bi and b,. As one would expect, the party which acts slower
improves its electoral chances (cf. 31 and 32, which show
cases extr~emely favourable for the right-wing and the left-
wing party, respectively). Whenever one should wish to
incorporate a re-election restrict,ion à la Frey, a dimin-
uation of the parameters b, or br would be appropriate
devices for the respective parties to extend the lives of
their governments.
Looking closer at the private employment fluctuations, we
can state that their appearance clearly remains cyclical. In
none of the simulated cases is private full employment ever23
reached. The number of peaks occurring in private employment
within one hundred y-ears remains the same (five). There
are, however, significant differences with respect to state
employ-ment and aggregate employment. This follows from the
results already mentioned, í.e. little change in the
economic cycle combined with considerable variation in
political swit.ches and, concomitantly, in employment policy.
A15u, it follows that employment policies do not uniformly
app~~ar as either cuuntercyclical or procyclical. We can
find ezamples that are shocking from the standard perspect-
ive of stabilisation policy, which assumes "the state" to
behave like a control engineer. Procyclical patterns occur
for instance when the political switches come "too late",
i.e. when a left-wing government only gains power after
privat,e e~mployment has already reached its trough. Then
private and state employment expand and decline together
(cf. figure 33).
Asymmetrical changes of b, and bz have interesting conse-
quc~nces, too. Isolated increases in the unemployment
avc:rsion (bl) favour the left-wing party and produce higher
averages of state employment, while higher tax aversion (bz)
favours the right- wing party and reduces average state
employment. Of course, the effects are accentuated if one of
the parameters decreases while the other rises at the same
time (cf. 34 with 35).
Cases improving the balance for the right-wing party, i.e.
cases with high tax and low unemployment aversion can
produce developments in which full employment is never
reached, which is even more likely if the capacity to chanSe
existing state employment levels is limited (cf. 35). In
cases favouring the left, we can find full employment being
rea)ized for considerable lapses of time while state
employment is seldom completely eliminated (see 34) or never
wiped out completely (see 36).
7. Summary and Outlook
The politico-economic model presented above is made up of a
business cycle model and a partisan two-party model of
political switches. Their coupling by way of introducing
various feedbacks gives rise to a rich spectrum of politico-
economic fluctuations. We saw that steady states would only
exist under extreme assumptions. The same is true for
private employment cycles without political regime switches.
With all feedbacks operating and with some symmetry in the
political parameters, more or less regular political
switches in majorities and employment policies will occur.C}.cles can either be constrained or uncanstrained by the
full employment ceiling. The latter variant seems to be more
relevant.. However, even if we restrict our attention to this
type of solution, the frequency uf political switches and
their implications for state employment can vary a lot with
the parameter configurations chosen.
The model can be extended in a number of directions, the
most of which have been investigated to some degree in the
relevant literature. First of all, there are more feedbacks
which can be accounted for, e.g. politically determined tax
shares t.o be paid out of wages and profits. Moreover, the
classical character of the economic mudel could be related
by allowing for product market disequilibria and budget
deficits. Voting decisisons could be based on more ~~ariab-
les, e.g. the level of public goods pro~isions and the costs
associated with it. There is the whole field of strategic
interaction among the players in our game.19 Players can
also be conceived as trying to change behaviour by influ-
encing perceptions or b,y exerting political pressure.
Finally, a more differentiated party structure would be
worthwhile to consider.25
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FOOTNOTES
~ 'fhe present version of this paper has profited from
comments by participants in various conferences and
seminars, i.e. the summer 1987 conference of the VVPE, a
conference at the University of Bielefeld in october 1987
organized by P. Flaschel and M. Kruger and a seminar at the
CentER (Tilburg University). Marco Wilke carefully read the
manuscript and suggested a lot of improvements, some of
which could not be taken into account in the present version
of the model, but will be considered in subsequent work.
1 Remember Keynes' famous remark about the possibility that
"the fear of a Labour government or a New Deal" may depress
enterprise ( Keynes 1936, p. 162). See also the early paper
by Akerman ( 1947) who states that during the interbellum
investment under Republican presidents was significantly
higher than under Democrats.
2 For an alternative coupling of economic cycles with a
political ( sub)system see Van Winden~Schram~Groot ( 1987).
3 Alternatively, one could assume a constant level of
capacity utilization. Both assumptions exclude the Keynesian
problematic of fluctuating levels of capacity utilization
and output concomítant to shifts in demand. This aspect of
reality could be tackled along the lines discussed in
Glombowski~Kruger (1987).
4 By proceeding like this, labour hoarding and changes in
work intensity, which might influence labour productivity,
are ignored.
5 We deliberately neglect here the poasible influence of
wage tax rates on wage claims, which appears in a number of
econometric models.
6 However, by choosing bi sufficiently high, the lag can be
reduced or even eliminated. Of course, more sophisticated
time lags could be introduced.
7 Alternatively, we could assume that additional costs are
exactly covered by the output of those activities. Instead
of neglecting the non-market results of public works
programmes one could also consider them as public gooda. But
then it would be natural to let these resulta exert some
influence on voting decisions. We have refrained from doing
so ~forthe sake of simplicity.
8 The zero level of the degree of state employment could be
replaced by a small positive limit.9 One could imagíne the shares g„ and gs tu differ with
respect to the political regimes, e.g. to be both higher
under a]eft-wing government. One would then have to
introduc~e regime-specific sets of paramFters, i.e~. (g„i ,ksi )
and (g,,,,gs~) for the left and t.he right. regime, re,spect,-
ivel.y. For the prt:sent moment, we neglect this pussibility.
10 Cf. for instance Glombowski~Kruger ( 1984) for a discus-
sion of various modes.
11 One could take into account that the sllocation of the
tax burden might depend on the political regime, sucht that,
for instance, the share to be paid out of profits would be
higher under a left-c:ing regime and vice versa. Here,
however, we do not pursue this idea any further.
12 We do not pay explicit attention to that enfranchised
part of the adult population who do not (any longer) belong
to the labour force. It would fit the spirit of the present
model to let their voting behaviour depend on e.g. old age
pensions or the income of household members on whom they
rely. Here, h~wever, we shall assume for the sake of
simplicity that they either do not ~-ote at all or, alterna-
tively, that their voting behaviour exactly mirrors that of
the members of the labour force.
13 The differences in voting behaviour are not brought about
by assuming distinctive vote shift functions for each group.
They are rather the consequence of differences in economic
positions on the basis of the same type of vote shift
functions.
14 A simplification is invol~ed because not all unemployed
or state employed have 'enjoyed' this status for the same
period of time. The vintage of the recently unemployed, for
instance, would need some time to shift entirely to the
left.
15 Note that we have deliberately assumed that a right-wing
regime will come to office in the case of an exact balance
of votes. Some additional fancy rules could cope with this
unlikely event, e.g. the incumbent government stays in
power; elections will have to be repeated, which will make
the opposition win; the decision is made by throwing coins
or let the top candidates play a tie-break.
16 Our concentration on the voting behaviour of private
sector workers is justified as it extends to overall
results. Due to the restriction 0( k~ 1, capitalists are a
minority of voters, so if all private sector workers would
eventually join the unemployed in voting left, their
combined numbers would be sufficient for a left majority.29
17 All examples referred to are documented in the appendi~.
The time path of the wage share has been omitted from the
figures where it disturbs transparency.
18 See, however, figure ~7 in which, after a double switch
iri political power, the oscillations in the second long
period of left-wing rule increase. This can possibly be
ascribed to the influence of a positive tax share of profits
in this esample.
19 Within a partisan set-up Alesina (1987) has made use of a
repeated game leading to the establishment of a common
policy of both parties. We feel that this approach runs
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APPENDiX
The following figures show the results of a number of
simulation runs. Along the abscissa time is measured, while
t.he coordinate measures various variables in percentages.
From below the time paths of the following variables can be
found: the rate of state employment (B.), the left-wing vote
share L, the gross wage share u, the rate of private
employment (Dp) and the rate of total employment ( Bo t p.),
Ahorizontal 50X-]ine is addedto facilitate detection of
political switchea. ln some of the figures the wage share
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b, - 0 b, - 0
a, - 0.336 a: - 0
m - 0.04 n - 0.01
ga - 2~3 go - 1~3
Li, (0) - 0.00
p(0) - 0.70
Ls ( 0 ) - 0 . 4979
z~(0) - 0
F~ -,~~~-~'
83 - 0 84 - 0
bi - 0.015 b~ - 0.015
E - 0 Q - 0.50






(3p (0) - 0.92 BB (0) - 0.00
g~(0) - 0.08 u(0) - 0.70
L(0) - 0.52 Ls(0) - 0.5348
iw(0) - 0.0282 Sc(0) - 0
Parameters
a~ - 0.86 as - 1.00 aa - 0 a~ - 0
bi - 0.30 b, - 0.30 bi - 0.015 b~ - 0.015
ai - 0.336 a~ - 0 E - 0 a - 0.50
m- 0.04 n - 0.01 k - 0.10 9- 4
gs - 2~3 ga - 1~3
~-----'--~- , - -i ~ -
~~ ~'` ' `` ~ i `` ~.






(3v ( 0 ) - 0 . 90
g,(0) - 0.10
L(0) - 0.52




t~ (0) - 0
Parameters
si - 0.86 a: - 1.00
b, - 0.60 bs - 0.60
a, - 0.336 aa - 0
m - 0.04 n - 0.01
gs - 2~3 go - 1~3
aa - 0 a~ - 0
b~ - 0.04 b~ - 0.04
E - 0 Q - 0.50
k - 0.10 0 - 4
.- ~ ~- ,1-J~i~:'~'...38










a, - 0.86 az - 1.00
bl - 0.60 b2 - 0.60
ai - 0.336 a: - 0
m - 0.04 n - 0.01
gs - 2~3 ga - 1~3
B,(0) - 0.00
p(0) - 0.70
Ls ( 0 ) - 0. 5348
i c ~ 0 ) - 0
aa - 0 a, - 0
b~ - 0.04 b~ - 0.04
E - 0 0 - 0.50











a, - 0.86 az - 1.00
b, - 0.30 b: - 0.05
a, - 0.336 a: - 0
m - 0.04 n - 0.01




t~ (0) - 0
a3 - 0 a~ - 0
bi - 0.015 b~ - 0.015
E - 0 v - 0.50




t. - 10 0
Initial conditions
Op(0) - 1.00 B6(0) - 0.00
g,(0) - 0.00 u( 0) - 0.70
L(0) - 0.55 La(0) - 0.605
z„(0) - 0 z~(0) - 0
Parameters
a, - 0.86 a: - 1.00 a, - 0 a. - 0
bi - 0.30 b, - 0.105 bi - 0.015 b~ - 0.015
ai - 0.336 as - 0 E - 0 a- 0.50
m- 0.04 n- 0.01 k- 0.10 9- 4






Oo (0) - 1.00 Li, (0) - 0.00
g,(0) - 0.00 N(0) - 0.70
L(0) - 0.55 L:(0) - 0.605
i„(0) - 0 z~(0) - 0
Parameters
81 - O.óÓ 82 - 1.00 83 - 0 8{ - 0
b, - 0.30 b: - 0.12 b~ - 0.015 b~ - 0.015
a, - 0.336 as - 0 E - 0 a - 0.50
m- 0.04 n- 0.01 k- 0.10 9- 4
ge - 2~3 g. - 1~342





ap(0) - 1.00 Cis(0) - 0.00
g,(0) - 0.00 u(0) - 0.70
L(0) - 0.35 L,(0) - 0.385
t..(0) - 0 i~ í0) - 0
Parameters
si - 0.86 az - 1.00 aa - 0 a~ - 0
bl - 0.09 bs - 0.30 bi - 0.015 br - 0.015
at - 0.336 as - 0 E - 0 a - 0.50
m- 0.04 n- 0.01 k- 0.10 0- 4














a, - 0.86 a: - 1.00
b, - 0.11 b: - 0.30
ai - 0.336 a: - 0
m - 0.04 n - 0.01
gB - 2~3 go - 1~3
Bs(0) - 0.00
u(0) - 0.70
Lz ( 0 ) - 0 . 385
i~(0) - 0
a3 - 0 a~ - 0
b, - 0.015 br - 0.015
E - 0 a - 0.50











a~ - 0.86 a: - 1.00
bi - 0.12 bz - 0.30
ai - 0.336 az - 0
m - 0.04 n - 0.01
g, - 2~3 g. - lI3
Os(0) - 0.00
p(0) - 0.70
Lz ( 0 ) - 0 . 385
t~ (0) - 0
a3 - 0 a~ - 0
b~ - 0.015 br - 0.015
E - 0 a - 0.50











a, - 0.86 as - 1.00
b, - 0. 3 0 b, - 0. 3 0
ai - 0.336 a: - 0
m - 0.04 n - 0.01
ga - 2r3 gn - 1~3
B,(0) - 0.00
u(O) - 0.70
L: (0) - 0.5611
z~ (0) - 0
a3 - U 8{ - U.U1
b~ - 0.015 br - 0.015
E - 0 v - 0.50











a, - 0.86 a: - 1.00
b, - 0.30 b: - 0.30
a, - 0.336 as - 0
m - 0.04 n - 0.01
g, - 2I3 ga - 1~3
Lig ( 0 ) - 0 . 00
N(0) - 0.70
Ls (0) - 0.5611
z~ (0) - 0
a3 - 0 a4 - 0.01
b~ - 0.015 br - O.OlS
E - 0 0 - 0.50









i,. ( 0 ) - 0 . 0357
Parameters
a, - 0.86 az - 1.00
b, - 0.30 bz - 0.30
a, - 0.336 az - 0.01
m - 0.04 n - 0.01
ge - 2~3 go - 1~3
a. (o) - o.oo
u(o) - 0.70
Lz (0) - 0.5611
i~ (0) - 0
az - 0 a~ - 0
b~ - 0.015 b~ - 0.015
E - 0 Q - 0.50











a, - 0.86 a,
b, - 0.30 b:
a, - 0.336 a:
m - 0.04 n
g. - 2I3 S.
Be(0) - 0.00
u(0) - 0.70






















(3P(0) - 0.8333 Bs(0) - 0.1667
g, (0) - 0 u(0) - 0.70
L(0) - 0.60 L:(0) - 0.592
i„(0) - 0.1176 z~(0) - 0
Parameters
a, - 0.86 a, - 1.00 aa - 0.40 a, - 0
b, - 0.30 b, - 0.30 b~ - 0.015 b~ - 0.015
a, - 0.336 a: - 0 E - 0 a- 0.50
m- 0.04 n - 0.01 k - 0.10 9- 4
ge - 2~3 go - 1~3









t,. ( 0 ) - 0 . 0253
Parameters
a, - 0.86 a: - 1.00
b, - 0.30 b: - 0.30
a, - 0.336 as - 0.01
m - 0.04 n - 0.01
gB - 2~3 g. - 1~3
~-------
G
~. (0) - 0.00
~,(0) - 0.70
Ls (0) - 0.5611
z~(0) - 0.0253
aa - 0.10 a, - 0
bi - 0.015 b. - 0.015
E - 0.30 0 - 0.50











ai - 0.86 az - 1.00
b~ - 0.30 bz - 0.30
ai - 0.336 a: - 0.01
m - 0.04 n - 0.01
gs - 2~3 go - 1~3
Be ( 0 ) - 0 . 00
u(o) - o.~o
Lz (0) - 0.5611
i~(0) - 0.0253
az - 0.10 aa - 0.01
b~ - 0.015 br - 0.015
E - 0.30 a - 0.50







ap ( 0) - 0. 84 f3e ( 0) - 0. 00
g,(0) - 0.16 N(0) - 0.70
L(0) - 0.55 L:(0) - 0.5298
z„(0) - 0.0426 i~(0) - 0.0426
Parameters
a, - 0.86 a: - 1.00 a~ - 0.10 a~ - 0.01
b, - 0.25 bz - 0.25 b~ - 0.01 br - 0.015
al - 0.336 az - 0.01 E - 0.30 0 - 0.50
m- 0.04 n- 0.01 k- 0.10 8- 4
g. - 2I3 g. - lI3











al - 0.86 a, - 1.00
b, - 0.30 b: - 0.05
a, - 0.336 a: - 0.01
m - 0.04 n - 0.01
g8 - 2~3 g, - 1~3
Be(0) - 0.00
u(a) - 0.70
Ls (0) - 0.7229
i~(0) - 0.0456
83 - 0. 10 8{ - 0.01
bi - 0.035 b~ - 0.015
E - 0.30 a - 0.50










a, - 0.86 ax - 1.00
b, - 0.08 bi - 0.30
a, - 0.336 as - 0.01
m - 0.04 n - 0.01





























al - 0.86 as - 1.00
b, - 0.11 bz - 0.30
a, - 0.336 as - 0.01
m - 0.04 n - 0.01
ge - 2~3 ga - lr3
Ci. (0) - 0.16
~(0) - 0.70
L, (0) - 0.3333
ic (0) - 0
83 - 0.10 84 - 0.01
bi - 0.015 b~ - 0.015
E - 0 v - 0.50












si - 0.86 a: - 1.00
bi - 0.30 b: - 0.05
ai - 0.336 as - 0
m - 0.04 n - 0.01
ge - 2~3 go - 1~3
,,J- ; ~; .
` !l




L2 ( 0 ) - 0 . 66
i~ (0) - 0
a, - 0.20 a~ - 0
bi - 0.01 b. - 0.015
E - 0 a - 0.50
k - 0.10 9 - 4













a, - 0.86 as - 1.00
b, - 0.30 b: - 0.30
a, - 0.336 a: - 0.01
m - 0.04 n - 0.01
gs - 2I3 ga - 1~3
B, (0) - 0
u(0) - 0.70
L:(0) - 0.5353
s~ ( 0 ) - 0. 0395
aa - 0.20 a~ - 0.01
bi - 0.015 b~ - 0.015
E - 0.30 a - 0.50












ai - 0.86 as - 1.00
b, - 0.10 b2 - 0.10
ai - 0.336 ax - 0.01
m - 0.04 n - 0.01
ge - 2~3 gr - lr3
F




a, - 0.20 a. - 0.01
b~ - 0.015 br - 0.015
E - 0.30 a - 0.50











a, - 0.86 az - 1.00
b, - 0.30 bz - 0.30
a, - 0.336 a: - 0.01
m - 0.04 n - 0.01
ga - 2~3 go - 1~3
ae (0) - 0
u(0) - 0.70
Lz (0) - 0.5353
i~ ( 0 ) - 0. 0395
83 - 0.2U a4 - O.U1
b, - 0.01 b~ - 0.01
E - 0.30 Q - 0.50










a, - 0.86 as - 1.00
b, - 0.10 bz - 0.10
a, - 0.336 a: - 0.01
m - 0.04 n - 0.01




















av(O) - 0.87 [i.(0) - 0
g,(0) - 0.13 ~(0) - 0.70
L(0) - 0.61 L:(0) - 0.6218
i.,(0) - 0.0475 z~(0) - 0
Parameters
a, - 0.86 a: - 1.00 aa - 0.10 as - 0
b, - 0.74 b~ - 0.70 b, - 0.20 br - 0.20
a, - 0.336 a: - 0 E- 0 0- 0.50
m- 0.04 n - 0.01 k - 0.10 0- 4


















L3a Ío) - 0
u(o) - 0.70
L2 (0) - 0.5353
t~(0) - 0.0395
ax - 1 . 00






















a, - 0.86 aa
b, - 0.30 b:
a, - 0.336 a:
m - 0.04 n













LiB (0) - 0
),(0) - 0.70






















i,. ( 0 ) - 0.0471
Parameters
a~ - 0.86 a: - 1.00
bl - 0.30 b, - 0.30
ai - 0.336 as - 0.01
m - 0.04 n - 0.01
g, - 2~3 g. - 1~3
Ba ( 0 ) - 0
~(0) - 0.70
L, ( 0 ) - 0. 5353
i~(0) - 0.0471
aa - 0.20 aa - 0.01
bi - 0.015 b~ - 0.015
E - 0.30 a - 0.50











i., ( 0 ) - 0 . 0395
Parameters
al - 0.86 a: - 1.00
b, - 0.30 b, - 0.10
a~ - 0.336 as - 0.01
m - 0.04 n - 0.01
g8 - 2I3 g„ - 1~3
,




a, - 0.20 a~ - 0.01
bi - 0.015 br - 0.015
E - 0.30 a - 0.50






aP(0) - 0.85 ae(0) - 0
g,(0) - 0.15 u(0) - 0.70
L(0) - 0.55 L:(0) - 0.5353
i,.(0) - 0.0395 i~(0) - 0.0395
Parameters
a, - 0.86 az - 1.00 a3 - 0.20 a~ - 0.01
b, - 0.10 bz - 0.30 b~ - 0.015 b~ - 0.015
a, - 0.336 az - 0.01 E- 0.30 a- 0.50
m- 0.04 n- 0.01 k- 0.10 8- 4








i., ( 0 ) - 0 . 0395
Parameters
a, - 0.86 si - 1.00
b, - 0.30 bs - 0.10
a, - 0.336 as - 0.01
m - 0.04 n - 0.01
g, - 2~3 go - 1~3
Cig (0) - 0
u(o) - o.~o
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